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WHAT THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES SAY ABOUT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PERSUASIVE GOVERNMENT
SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS
LESLIE GIELOW JACOBS t
INTRODUCTION
In Malaysia, it's a diseased lung.' In Thailand, it's skulls floating
behind the smoker.2 In Brazil, it's a dead fetus lying among cigarette
butts.3 "In New Zealand, it's a gangrenous foot."4 In the United States,
it's going to be the same type of color graphics, along with pointed warn-
ings, covering the top half of the cigarette package. 5 And tobacco labels
are just the tip of the iceberg. Alcohol vendors already must include
warnings on their labels, 6 the new national health reform legislation re-
quires that fast food chains post calorie counts on signs and menus, 7 and
proposals continue to surface to mandate "cigarette-style" warnings on a
range of other products because they pose a public health danger. Prod-
ucts targeted for warning labels, both here and abroad, include sugary
sodas, violent video games, cell phones, sun beds, butter, cheese, foods
children consume which contain artificial coloring that may increase
hyperactivity, and vacation travel because it results in global warming.
8
t Professor and Director, Capital Center for Public Law & Policy, University of the Pacific,
McGeorge School of Law. Thanks to Abner Greene and Helen Norton for their helpful comments on
a draft of a related article. Thanks to Mike Claiborne and Rebecca Whitfield for their excellent
research assistance.
I. Ranit Mishori, Packing a Heavier Warning; Elsewhere, Cigarette Boxes Bear Graphic
Evidence of Smoking's Ill Effects; U.S. Labels Will Soon Do the Same, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2009, at
HEI.
2. Miranda Hitti, Cigarette Warnings: Is Bigger Better?, CBS NEWS.COM, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2007/02/06/health/webmd/main2439660.shtml.
3. Mishori, supra note 1, at HEI.
4. Id.
5. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act requires that the Secretary of
Health and Human Services issue guidelines no later than June 2011 requiring color graphics depict-
ing the health effects of smoking to accompany label warnings. See Act of June 22, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-31, § 201(d), 123 Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d)).
6. See MICHAELS. WOGALTER, HANDBOOK OF WARNINGS 669-85 (2006).
7. Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES, March
24, 2010, at B 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com2010/03/24/business/24menu.html.
8. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Joe Baca, Rep. Baca Introduces Legislation to
Make Violent Video Games Sold With Health Warning Label (Jan. 7, 2009) ("Warning: Excessive
exposure to violent video games and other violent media has been linked to aggressive behavior."),
available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca43_baca/videogamehealth_010709.html; Press
Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, CSPI Calls on FDA to Require Health Warnings on Sodas
(July 13, 2005), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/20050713l.html ("To help protect your
waistline and your teeth, consider drinking diet sodas or water."); Daily Mail Online, Dairy Products
to Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings as Government Uses 'Shock Tactics', MAIL ONLINE,
March 3, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-52493]/Dairy-products-carry-cigarette-
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Of course, producers protest the labeling requirements and, fre-
quently, succeed in defeating proposed regulation.9 But sometimes they
don't; and then, increasingly, they go to court, arguing that the Constitu-
tion protects the integrity of their commercial message from government
imposed speech.' 0 Specifically, cigarette sellers contend that, even if the
purpose is public protection, Congress cannot force them "to disseminate
a Government-drafted anti-tobacco message" or to "stigmatize their own
product on their own packaging."' 1 The district court hearing the ciga-
rette sellers' case has rejected this part of their challenge, 12 but the parties
will likely appeal. And other challenges to new labeling requirements
will surely follow.
One may have thought this battle was over, given the ubiquity of
product disclosure requirements and the fact that more cautious and less
eye-catching cigarette package warnings have been in place for over 40
years. 13 Furthermore, even though the Court has elevated product adver-
tising to a category of constitutionally protected speech, early on it sig-
naled that its skepticism would be directed primarily toward regulations
that restricted the free flow of commercial speech 14 and that it would
accord more deferential review to requirements that vendors disclose
additional information along with their own speech.15
style-health-wamings-Government-uses-shock-tactics.htm (England's Food Standards Agency
considered and rejected a proposal to put warnings on cheese and butter); Kate Devlin, Sunbeds
'Should Carry Cigarette-Style Health Warnings', TELEGRAPH, June 20, 2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/healthnews/5579038/Sunbeds-should-carry-cigarette-style-health-
warnings.html; Liane Katz, Call For Cigarette-Style Warnings for Flights, GUARDIAN.CO.UK, April
5, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/travel/2007/apr/05/travelnews.green.cheapflights; SnackCheck,
The Twenty Worst Snacks, http://www.snackcheck.co.uk/2566/bottom-20-snacks/ (last visited June
3, 2010) ("In July 2010, the [European Union] will make it mandatory to put cigarette-style labels on
products that include these colourings [that the Hyperactive Children's Support Group recommends
againsti."); Posting of Michelle Quinn to The Bay Area, S.F. May Require Warnings About Cell-
phone Radiation, http://bayarea.blogs.nytimes.com2009/1 2/23/sf-may-require-warnings-about-
cellphone-radiation (Dec. 23, 2009, 5:40 PM).
9. See, e.g., Press Release, Wash. Legal Found., WLF Opposes Efforts By Food Police
Targeting Soft Drink Beverages, Dec. 16, 2005 (explaining comments filed with Food and Drug
Administration opposing proposed labeling requirement).
10. See infra Part I.C (discussing recent lower court disclosure requirement decisions).
11. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief 39, 51, Commonwealth
Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. I:09-CV-117-M) (plain-
tiffs include: Commonwealth Brands, Inc.; Conwood Co., LLC; Discount Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc.; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; National Tobacco Co.; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.).
12. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 529-30 (W.D. Ky.
2010).
13. The 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health led to enactment of the
FCLAA in 1965, which required that health warnings be included on cigarette packages. Lindsey v.
Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep't, 195 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). The statute and its
amendments represented a compromise between health proponents and tobacco interests. NAT'L
CANCER INST., MONOGRAPH 19: THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING AND REDUCING TOBACCO
USE 301-03 (2008).
14. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 755
(1976).
15. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
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But things are changing across the free speech landscape. Recently,
the Supreme Court has rendered decisions that interpret the free speech
guarantee more expansively to protect commercial
16 and corporate 17
speakers from government regulations that restrict their speech. The re-
curring and unresolved question is whether and how these changes in the
jurisprudence of speech restrictions will modify the authority of govern-
ments to achieve their legitimate regulatory objectives by means of in-
formation disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. All of
the current Supreme Court justices agree that governments have the con-
stitutional authority to require commercial speakers to publish some re-
levant facts when the government purpose is to supplement advertising
that would otherwise be false, misleading, or have the potential to mis-
lead consumers.' 8 But countering the potential for consumer deception
has never been the only purpose that disclosure requirements have
served.19 Increasingly, government regulators require disclosure along
with commercial speech to counter the potential for consumer persuasion
as well. That is, governments select information and require its disclo-
sure not only to aid the rational, self-interested decision making of indi-
vidual consumers, but also to influence the consumer's decision making
in a way that serves a broader public interest.20 Consequently, that broad-
er public interest may well be reducing demand for the lawful product on
which the information disclosure must appear. In the context of speech
restraints, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that governments may
not constitutionally engage in the. "paternalism" of restricting truthful
commercial speech that individual consumers may hear, when the pur-
pose of that restriction is to reduce demand for a lawful product. 21 Left
uncertain is whether the Court's constitutional interpretations that limit
16. See infra Part I (discussion of commercial speech).
17. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (pre-election
corporate spending is constitutionally protected from federal regulation).
18. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1341 (2010) (up-
holding federal statutory requirement that law firms offering bankruptcy services "include certain
information about its bankruptcy-assistance and related services" because the requirement was
"'reasonably related to the [Government's] interest in preventing deception of consumers' (quoting
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651)); Id. 1343 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring) (acknowledging the Court's
"longstanding assumption that a consumer-fraud regulation that compels the disclosure of certain
factual information in advertisements may intrude less significantly on First Amendment interests
than an outright prohibition on all advertisements that have the potential to mislead").
19. See Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555,
584 (2006) ("[C]ommercial speech is routinely and pervasively compelled for reasons that have little
to do with the prevention of deception."); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes,
and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 123, 125-27 (1996).
20. The new cigarette package labeling mandate makes obvious the persuasive objectives that
underpin, at least in part, many disclosure requirements imposed to advance public purposes in the
modern marketplace. It is indeed difficult to deny that the new labeling mandate is "plainly intended
to deliver a visually striking, attention-grabbing anti-smoking message." Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief 153, Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d
512 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (No. 1:09-CV-1 17-M).
21. For a discussion of the anti-paternalism trend in the Court's commercial speech jurispru-
dence, see infra Part I.C.2.
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regulators' abilities to restrict commercial speech because consumers
may find it persuasive also apply to contract government discretion to
impose commercial speech disclosure requirements for the same public
purpose of reducing demand and because of the same presumption about
the potentially persuasive effect of unsupplemented speech.
Yet this apparent uncertainty in the commercial speech jurispru-
dence has an odd and inconsistent counterpart. At the same time that
members of the Court have suggested disclosure requirements imposed
on commercial speech for purposes other than preventing consumer de-
ception may be constitutionally suspect, in the entirely analogous context
of the abortion service transaction, the Court has applied deferential ra-
tional basis review to uphold selective and persuasive disclosure re-
quirements that were imposed for purposes other than correcting poten-
tially misleading speech.22 Although the Court's plurality analysis with
respect to the Free Speech Clause analysis' application to "informed con-
sent" to abortion requirements was terse, the lower courts have parsed,
expanded, and relied upon it.23 In light of the Court's changing jurispru-
dence, it is not clear what level of scrutiny should apply to the emerging
genre of informational and persuasive disclosure requirements that the
new cigarette labels exemplify. What is clear is that there is no difference
between the speakers' Free Speech Clause rights in the two lines of cases
that should lead to a different judicial analysis of government disclosure
requirements imposed on them. So long as the informed consent to abor-
tion jurisprudence remains unchanged, it is controlling in the context of
commercial speech disclosures. 24 Deferential rational basis scrutiny ap-
plies to judicial evaluations of information disclosure mandates imposed
on product labels and other types of commercial speech, even if the gov-
ernment's purpose is something other than preventing consumer decep-
tion and even if the information is obviously selected and presented to
persuade.
Part I situates disclosure requirements within the framework the
Court has developed to evaluate government regulations of commercial
speech. Part 1H describes the different law that courts have developed to
evaluate disclosure requirements imposed on the abortion procedure. Part
I points out that what courts tend to treat as different lines of cases-
compelled commercial speech and abortion disclosure-in fact involve
the same type of government action imposed on the same category of
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) ("To be sure, the phy-
sician's First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of medi-
cine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitutional infirmity
in the requirement that the physician provide the information mandated by the State here.") (citations
omitted).
23. See infra Part l.B.
24. See infra Part Ill.
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speech, and so the Free Speech Clause analysis applied to each must be
the same.
I. THE LAW OF GOVERNMENT MANDATED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
DISCLOSURES
Government entities at all levels mandate that certain information
appear on product labels. These include Congress, 25 a number of federal
government agencies,26 state legislatures,27 state agencies,28 and city
councils and agencies. 29 California voters imposed a labeling require-
ment by voter initiative. 30 Product sellers have always used the political
process to fight labeling requirements, and have often succeeded. 3' Only
fairly recently have they begun to use the Free Speech Clause as a direct
means of challenging information disclosure requirements. 32 These chal-
lenges rely both on the lack of clarity in the disclosure requirement juris-
prudence and the trend evident in the speech restraint cases to interpret
the rights of corporate and commercial speakers more expansively to
limit the scope of permissible government regulatory actions.
A. The Disclosure Distinction in the Supreme Court's Commercial
Speech Jurisprudence
Free Speech Clause protection for commercial speech began in the
mid 1970's. Reversing previous interpretations, in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3 3 the Court
25. See, e.g., Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
26. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1 -101.95 (2010) (Food and Drug Administration regulations
imposing Food for Human Consumption Labeling Standards); 27 C.F.R. §§ 4.1-4.5 (2010) (De-
partment of the Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, imposing labeling require-
ments for wine); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1201.1-1420.1 (2010) (Consumer Product Safety Commission prod-
uct labeling standards).
27. See, e.g., CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST & NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
SHREDDING THE FOOD SAFETY NET (2006), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/shredding
.pdf (reviewing state food safety and labeling laws that proposed action in Congress would preempt).
28. See, e.g., CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 32912-32921 (West 1994) (milk product label-
ing); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 19080-19093 (West 1964) (home furnishings labeling).
29. See, e.g., 8 S.F. CAL. HEALTH CODE § 468.3 (2010) (menu labeling at chain restaurants).
30. Proposition 65, which became law as the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986, requires businesses to "notify Californians about significant amounts of chemicals in
the products they purchase, in their homes or workplaces, or that are released into the environment."
OEHHA Proposition 65: Proposition 65 in Plain Language!, http://oehha.ca.gov/Prop65/backgroundl
p65plain.html (last visited June 4, 2010).
31. See, e.g., Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, The FDA, Preemption, and the Supreme
Court, 358 NEw ENG. J. of MED. 1883, 1884-85 (2008) (describing efforts by cigarette makers and
drug manufacturers to obtain immunity from state law requirements, including disclosure require-
ments, through federal law preemption); Dan Shapley, Pennsylvania Allows Hormone-Free Milk
Labeling: Monsanto is Lobbying States to Restrict Labeling, THE DAILY GREEN, Jan. 17, 2008,
available at http://www.thedailygreen.com/healthy-eating/eat-safe/hormone-free-milk-47011701
#ixzz0f5Mm9Csu.
32. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. Of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117-18 (2d
Cir. 2009) (fast food calorie count labels); Nat'l Elec. Mfr. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 106 (2d
Cir. 2001) (labeling of products containing mercury); Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d
67, 69 (2d Cir. 1996) (milk hormone labels).
33. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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held that speech "propos[ing] a commercial transaction" is not "wholly
outside the protection of the First Amendment." 34 The Court explained
that the constitutional protection commercial speech receives is grounded
in the "public interest that [economic] decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well-informed," and in the "particular consumer's interest
in the free flow of commercial information. 35 In other cases the Court
has described "[t]he commercial marketplace" as "a forum where ideas
and information flourish," to which "the general rule" applies, "that the
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the
information presented. 36 Still, a majority of the Court continues to ac-
knowledge "the 'distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government
regulation, and other varieties of speech.'
3 7
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York, 38 the Court established a four-part test 39 which both
protects commercial speech because of its "constitutional value" and
recognizes that commercial speech's distinguishing attributes make cer-
tain types of content based government regulation more constitutionally
permissible.40 The Court has described the Central Hudson test as impos-
ing "intermediate scrutiny," a standard between the rigorous strict scru-
tiny that applies to other speech regulations and the rational basis stan-
dard that the Court uses to review regulations that do not implicate the
free speech right.41 Although a number of justices have criticized the test
as insufficiently protective of commercial speech, at least in particular
contexts, the Court's majority continues to apply it to evaluate regula-
tions that restrict or suppress commercial speech. 42
34. Id. at 760-62 (overruling Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942)).
35. Id. at 763, 765.
36. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761,767 (1993)).
37. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980)).
38. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
39. Id. at 564 (stating that if the speech is "neither misleading nor related to unlawful activ-
ity," the state "must assert a substantial interest," the restriction must "directly advance" that interest,
and the restriction must not be "excessive," meaning it cannot survive if more limited means could
accomplish the purpose).
40. Id. at 561. Specifically, the characteristics that distinguish commercial speech are its
"greater objectivity," which "justifies affording the State more freedom to distinguish false commer-
cial advertisements from true ones," and its "greater hardiness," which "inspired as it is by the profit
motive, likely diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation." 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,499 (1996) (plurality opinion).
41. Milavetz , Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010); Loril-
lard, 533 U.S. at 554 (describing Central Hudson test as "'substantially similar' to the test for time,
place, and manner restrictions").
42. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002) (noting that "several
Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it
should apply in particular cases," but nevertheless finding it to provide "'an adequate basis for
decision"' of the case) (quoting Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 554-555)).
[Vol. 87:4
2010] GOVERNMENT SPEECH ON PRODUCT LABELS 861
Soon after its decision in Central Hudson, however, the Court relied
upon the differences between commercial and other constitutionally pro-
tected speech to hold that a lower level of judicial scrutiny should apply
to at least certain types of government regulations requiring commercial
speakers to disclose additional information about their products or ser-
vices than to those that directly restrict or suppress commercial speech.43
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio,44 an attorney challenged the constitutionality of a state disciplinary
rule requiring any attorney advertisement that mentioned contingent fee
rates to "disclos[e] whether percentages are computed before or after
deduction of court costs and expenses." 45 His advertisement had stated
that clients would pay no fees if they lost, but it did not disclose that they
would still be liable for the lawsuit's costs.46 The Ohio Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel filed a complaint, alleging that, absent the required dis-
closure, the attorney's advertising was "deceptive" in violation of the
disciplinary rule.47 The Court upheld application of the disciplinary rule
to sanction the attorney for failing to include the required disclosure.48
The Court explicitly rejected the attorney's argument that "precisely
the same inquiry as determining the validity of [] restrictions on advertis-
ing content" should apply to determine the constitutionality of the disclo-
sure requirement. 49 The Court stated that the "[a]ppellant ... overlooks
material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohi-
bitions on speech." 50 The Court distinguished instances in which gov-
ernment mandated noncommercial speakers recite or publicize ideologi-
cal speech-mandates which the Court has consistently invalidated 5 1-
from the situation before it, in which the government required commer-
cial speakers to supplement their own commercial speech with additional
facts:
But the interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as
those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette. Ohio has not at-
tempted to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein." The State has attempted only to pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising, and its pre-
43. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
44. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
45. Id. at 633 (alteration in original).
46. Id. at 652.
47. Id. at 631.
48. Id. at 655.
49. Id. at 650.
50. Id.
51. See id. (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating government re-
quirement that plaintiff display "Live Free or Die" license plate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Torn-
illo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right of reply requirement for newspaper); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge recitation and flag sa-
lute)).
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scription has taken the form of a requirement that appellant include in
his advertising purely factual and uncontroversial information about
the terms under which his services will be available. Because the ex-
tension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justi-
fied principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is mi-
nimal. Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date,
we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements trench
much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat prohibi-
tions on speech, "waming[s] or disclaimer[s] might be appropriately
required ... in order to dissipate the possibility of consumer confu-
sion or deception." 52
However, the Court added:
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate
the advertiser's First Amendment rights at all. We recognize that un-
justified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might offend
the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech. But
we hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers.
53
The Court found the disciplinary rule disclosure requirement in the case
met the rational basis test, which meant that it accepted as reasonable the
state's assertion that the potential harm of deception existed, that the
disclaimer would help to correct it,54 and that it did not require the means
be closely tailored to achieve this end.55 The Court also rejected the at-
52. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (alterations in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 652-53 ("The assumption that substantial numbers of potential clients would be so
misled is hardly a speculative one: it is a commonplace that members of the public are often unaware
of the technical meanings of such terms as 'fees' and 'costs'-terms that, in ordinary usage, might
well be virtually interchangeable. When the possibility of deception is as self-evident as it is in this
case, we need not require the State to 'conduct a survey of the ... public before it [may] determine
that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.' The State's position that it is deceptive to em-
ploy advertising that refers to contingent-fee arrangements without mentioning the client's liability
for costs is reasonable enough to support a requirement that information regarding the client's liabil-
ity for costs be disclosed." (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965)
(alterations in original)).
55. Id. at 651 n.14 ("Although we have subjected outright prohibitions on speech to [least
restrictive means] analysis, all our discussions of restraints on commercial speech have recom-
mended disclosure requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to actual sup-
pression of speech. Because the First Amendment interests implicated by disclosure requirements
are substantially weaker than those at stake when speech is actually suppressed, we do not think it
appropriate to strike down such requirements merely because other possible means by which the
State might achieve its purposes can be hypothesized. Similarly, we are unpersuaded by appellant's
argument that a disclosure requirement is subject to attack if it is 'under-inclusive'-that is, if it does
not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate. As a general matter, governments are
entitled to attack problems piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental that
strict scrutiny must be applied. The right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate informa-
tion regarding his services is not such a fundamental right." (citations omitted)).
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torney's claim that its application "would in fact be unduly burdensome
and would tend to chill advertising of contingent-fee arrangements.
'" 56
The Court in Zauderer thus planted the seeds for either a broad or
narrow interpretation of its holding. On the one hand, the Court broadly
distinguished between "disclosure requirements" and "outright prohibi-
tions on speech," noting that the former is an "acceptable less restrictive
alternative to actual suppression of speech. 5 7 It affirmed that the primary
reason commercial speech receives protection is "the value to consumers
of the information," and that, although vendors may prefer not to dis-
close certain information about their products or services, the extent of
their "constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in . . . advertising is minimal. 58 It also confirmed
that governments may be selective rather than comprehensive in mandat-
ing factual disclosures, addressing one problem at a time. 9
On the other hand, and despite the broad language and reasoning
that seem to distinguish between speech restraints and required factual
disclosures, the Court discussed disclosure requirements in the context of
one imposed for the purpose of correcting commercial speech that would
otherwise be deceptive, and included that government purpose in the
articulation of its rational basis test.60 The Court also noted that, although
listeners' interests are the primary reason the Constitution protects com-
mercial speech, advertisers in fact possess "First Amendment rights,"
and that, at some point, even disclosure requirements may be "unjusti-
fied" or "unduly burdensome" and "might offend the First Amendment
by chilling protected commercial speech.'
In the 25 years since Zauderer, the Court's decisions and the state-
ments of various justices have muddied, rather than clarified, the deci-
sion's meaning with respect to the appropriate standard of review for
disclosure requirements imposed on commercial speech. In Meese v.
Keene,62 decided one year after Zauderer, the Court rejected a challenge
56. Id. at 652 n. 15 ("Evaluation of this claim is somewhat difficult in light of the Ohio court's
failure to specify precisely what disclosures were required. The gist of the report of the Board of
Commissioners on this point, however, was that appellant's advertising was potentially deceptive
because it 'left standing the impression that if there were no recovery, the client would owe nothing.'
Accordingly, the report at a minimum suggests that an attorney advertising a contingent fee must
disclose that a client may be liable for costs even if the lawsuit is unsuccessful. The report and the
opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court also suggest that the attorney's contingent-fee rate must be
disclosed. Neither requirement seems intrinsically burdensome; and they certainly cannot be said to
be unreasonable as applied to appellant, who included in his advertisement no information whatso-
ever regarding costs and fee rates. This case does not provide any factual basis for finding that
Ohio's disclosure requirements are unduly burdensome." (citations omitted)).
57. Id. at 650-51 & n.14.
58. Id. at 651 (first emphasis added).
59. Seeid. at651 n.14.
60. Id. at 651 ("[A]n advertiser's rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure re-
quirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers.").
61. Id.
62. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
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by a California legislator to a federal statutory designation of films pro-
duced by the Canadian government as "political propaganda" and the
requirement that he disclose details about his connections to the "foreign
government" producer and details of its required registration with the
Department of Justice pursuant to the statute. 63 Although the case in-
volved a disclosure requirement imposed on core political speech, the
Court upheld the statutory requirements in strong language that distin-
guished disclosure requirements from prohibitions of speech:
Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advo-
cacy materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from con-
version, confusion, or deceit. To the contrary, Congress simply re-
quired the disseminators of such material to make additional disclo-
sures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the
propaganda. . . . Disseminators of propaganda may go beyond the
disclosures required by statute and add any further information they
think germane to the public's viewing of the materials. By compel-
ling some disclosure of information and permitting more, the Act's
approach recognizes that the best remedy for misleading or inaccu-
rate speech contained within materials subject to the Act is fair, truth-
ful, and accurate speech.
64
In contrast to its deferential treatment of Congress's "propaganda"
label, the Court in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Board of Accountancy65 more rigorously reviewed a
state bar's reprimand of an attorney for, among other things, failing to
include a disclaimer in her advertising that explained the meaning of her
specialty designation.66 The Court's analysis of the disclaimer require-
ment confusingly mixed references to considerations that it used in Zau-
derer to analyze the constitutionality of disclosure requirements imposed
on commercial speech with references to considerations that it employs
to determine whether commercial speech restraints comport with the free
speech guarantee.
67
63. Id. at 467, 469. The legislator was not required to place the term "political propaganda" on
the film as he showed it to a public audience. The Court nevertheless held that he had demonstrated
injury sufficient to establish standing to challenge the term in the statute based upon evidence that
demonstrated that "his exhibition of films that have been classified as 'political propaganda' by the
Department of Justice would substantially harm his chances for reelection and would adversely
affect his reputation in the community." Id. at 474.
64. Id. at 481 ("The prospective viewers of the three films at issue may harbor an unreasoning
prejudice against arguments that have been identified as the 'political propaganda' of foreign princi-
pals and their agents, but the Act allows appellee to combat any such bias simply by explaining-
before, during, or after the film, or in a wholly separate context-that Canada's interest in the conse-
quences of nuclear war and acid rain does not necessarily undermine the integrity or the persuasive-
ness of its advocacy.").
65. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
66. See id. at 139-40.
67. Most of the case involved review of the reprimand based upon the content of the attor-
ney's advertising, without reference to the possible alternative of including a disclaimer to explain
the significance of the specialty designation. The Court characterized the sanctions in this respect as
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In other cases not directly addressing disclosure requirements, com-
binations of justices have distinguished Zauderer in ways that suggest a
narrow interpretation. In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc.,68 a
closely divided Court rejected the claim of fruit growers that the manda-
tory assessments to fund generic advertising violated their free speech
rights.69 The four dissenting justices would have accepted it, and in the
course of their discussion rejected Zauderer as precedent for low level
scrutiny of the subsidization mandate:
In speaking of the objecting lawyer's comparatively modest interest
in challenging the state requirement, we referred to protection of
commercial speech as "justified principally by the value to consum-
ers of the information such speech provides .... ." We said "princi-
pally," not exclusively, and proceeded to uphold the state require-
ment not because a regulation adding to public information is im-
mune from scrutiny, but because the mandate at issue bore a reason-
able relation to the "State's interest in preventing deception of con-
sumers," who might otherwise be ignorant of the real terms on which
the advertiser intended to do business. Zauderer thereby reaffirmed a
longstanding preference for disclosure requirements over outright
bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the potential of commercial
messages to mislead by saying too little. But however long the pedi-
gree of such mandates may be, and however broad the government's
authority to impose them, Zauderer carries no authority for a man-
date unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete
commercial messages.70
"restraints" on commercial speech and analyzed them under its mid-level test for commercial speech
restrictions, finding that the state had not established a substantial purpose for imposing the restric-
tion because it had not offered evidence that the specialty designation was actually or inherently
misleading. Id. at 139-43. At the end of its opinion, however, the Court addressed the state's alterna-
tive claim that, even if it could not prohibit the attorney's speech entirely, it was entitled to repri-
mand her for failing to publish a disclaimer because her use of the specialty designation was "poten-
tially misleading." Id. at 146. The Court did not directly acknowledge that the state's use of the
alternate means of a disclosure requirement might subject its action to a more lenient, rational basis
review under Zauderer. Instead, it said that "[i]f the 'protections afforded commercial speech are to
retain their force,"' then "we cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the Board's burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction
will in fact alleviate them to a material degree,"' which are requirements drawn from the Central
Hudson test that applies to speech restraints. Id. at 146 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 648-49 (1985) (addressing speech restraints),
and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 771 (1993)). Next, however, the Court applied a portion of its
disclosure requirement reasoning in Zauderer, finding that the disclaimer at issue was "copiously
detailed," and invalidating it as unduly burdensome. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 146-47 & n. 11. Throughout
its decision, the Court emphasized the state of the record, indicating that, with respect to the dis-
claimer, its analysis might well have been different had the State been able to "point to any harm that
is potentially real, not purely hypothetical." Id. at 146. The Court noted, as well, that it was unsure
whether use of the disclaimer would have "saved [the attorney] from censure," suggesting that it
viewed the reprimand, in the context of the case, as equivalent to a speech restraint. Id. at 147 n. 1I.
68. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
69. Id. at 460-6 1.
70. Id. at 490-91 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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In United States v. United Foods, Inc.,71 the Glickman dissenters
joined several justices in the majority to invalidate a federal statutory
requirement that mushroom producers pay an assessment for generic
advertising that was not government speech.72 Echoing the Glickman
dissenters, the United Foods Court adopted the view that product pro-
ducers have First Amendment rights that may be infringed by regulatory
actions compelling them to subsidize commercial speech with which
they disagree. In its short opinion, the Court also distinguished Zauderer:
Noting that substantial numbers of potential clients might be misled
by omission of the explanation, the [Zauderer] Court sustained the
requirement as consistent with the State's interest in "preventing de-
ception of consumers." There is no suggestion in the case now before
us that the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of
private persons to pay for speech by others are somehow necessary to
make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers.
73
Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg commented directly on the confu-
sion that the Court's case law and comments have engendered in their
joint dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in a case in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Florida statute imposing dis-
closure requirements on dentists who practice implant dentistry.74 The
two justices argued that the Court should "provide lower courts with
guidance on the subject of state-mandated disclaimers," and distin-
guished Zauderer as insufficient to validate the "government-scripted
disclaimer" at issue in that case.75
Most recently, eight members of the Court avoided addressing the
outer boundaries of Zauderer's applicability by finding that a disclosure
requirement imposed on bankruptcy attorneys was subject to lenient ra-
tional basis review because the government's purpose was to correct
misleading commercial speech.76 Justice Thomas concurred, agreeing to
resolve the case pursuant to Zauderer, but indicating that he would be
willing to reexamine whether its standard "provide[s] sufficient First
Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosures" in an
appropriate case.77
71. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
72. Id. at 408-409.
73. Id. at 416 (citation omitted). The Justices in the majority were Kennedy, Rehnquist, Ste-
vens, Scalia, Souter and Thomas.
74. Borgner v. Ha. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080, 1080 (2002).
75. Id. The Justices also noted that the dentist "also raises doubts about whether the Eleventh
Circuit's conclusion is consistent with Ibanez." Id.
76. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010).
77. Id. at 1342-45 & n. I (expressing doubt that the lesser burden that disclosure requirements
may impose on speakers 'justifies an entirely different standard of review for regulations that com-
pel, rather than suppress, commercial speech").
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B. The Consequences of Applying Commercial Speech Restraint Analysis
to Information Disclosure Requirements
Most of the commercial speech jurisprudence has developed in the
context of speech restraints. The general speech-protective trend appar-
ent in these cases, as well as the specific judgments that guide the
Court's application of the prongs of the Central Hudson test, provide
important background that helps to explain the uncertainty in the current
jurisprudence of disclosure requirements. The cases also provide a fore-
shadowing of the limitations government regulators would face if a ma-
jority of the Court were to limit the application of Zauderer's deferential
review standard to disclosure requirements imposed to correct deceptive
or misleading commercial speech.
In its most recent articulation, the Court confirmed that "[t]he Cen-
tral Hudson test is significantly stricter than the rational basis test,,,
7 8
which it described as follows:
[W]e ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech con-
cerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not
protected by the First Amendment. If the speech concerns lawful ac-
tivity and is not misleading, however, we next ask "whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial." If it is, then we "deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted," and, finally, "whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest." Each of these latter three inquiries
must be answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found
constitutional.
79
This section discusses the consequences of transposing each of
these "stricter" speech restraint inquiries into the analysis of disclosure
requirements imposed on commercial speech.
1. Deceptive or Misleading Speech
Central Hudson's first prong most obviously incorporates the criti-
cal differences the Court has identified between commercial and other
types of speech. Although content discrimination is highly suspect with
respect to non-commercial speech, this prong permits governments to
suppress entirely commercial speech that is "more likely to deceive the
public than to inform it."'80 While a deferential approach to government
judgments could provide wide latitude to restrict commercial speech, the
choice apparent in the speech restraint cases is instead that the Court will
carefully scrutinize a government determination that commercial speech
should be suppressed to protect consumers from being deceived. The
78. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
79. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
80. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
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Court has clarified that government authority to suppress commercial
speech entirely extends only to speech that is in fact deceptive or "inher-
ently misleading."'8' The Court requires proof to find speech in fact de-
ceptive, and will exercise de novo review to determine whether a
statement is inherently misleading.83 It has rejected state determinations
that certain advertising claims met either of these standards, noting "the
complete absence of any evidence of deception" 84 and opining that
members of the public are generally sophisticated enough to recognize
the limits of advertising and are not as easily misled as would-be regula-
tors claim them to be.
85
By contrast, the Court tends to accord more deference to govern-
ment determinations that commercial speech may mislead consumers
when the regulatory means are mandated disclosure rather than restric-
tion of speech. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that disclosure re-
quirements are less burdensome alternatives to restrictions of commercial
speech. Despite use of the same word, the Court in Zauderer seemed to
apply different degrees of deference to the State's assertions that the at-
torney's speech was "deceptive" according to the remedy the State
sought to apply.86 Since Zauderer, the Court has changed its wording
somewhat, acknowledging that a government's discretion to impose dis-
closure requirements extends beyond what is required to justify a speech
restraint, to supplementing speech that is "potentially misleading."
87
While it has seemed to say that, even when imposing a disclosure
requirement, a government regulator must demonstrate the "harms it
recites are real, 88 most recently, eight members of the Court signed on
to a reiteration of Zauderer's conclusion that a "possibility of deception"
may be so "self-evident" that no specific proof by the government regu-
81. See Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990) ("A
State may not.., completely ban statements that are not actually or inherently misleading.").
82. See id. at 106 ("Given the complete absence of any evidence of deception in the present
case, we must reject the contention that petititioner's letterhead is actually misleading.").
83. See id. at 108.
84. Id. at 106.
85. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 105 ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of
petititioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television.");
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977) (rejecting the assumption "that the public is
not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising" as based on an "underestimation of
the public").
86. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 648 (1985) (rejecting State's contention that illustrations in advertisements created "unac-
ceptable risks that the public will be misled, manipulated, or confused" as sufficient to justify sup-
pressing them), with id. at 652-53 (accepting State's contention that the attorney's reference to
"fees" without mention of "costs" was "deceptive" where the remedy was a disclosure requirement).
87. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007)
("[T]he Court has made a doctrinal refinement, distinguishing in the professional services context
between commercial speech that is inherently or actually misleading and commercial speech that is
only potentially misleading .... We need not (and do not) decide the issue, but we note that recent
decisions have applied this dichotomy beyond the professional services context.").
88. Ibanez v. Fla Dep't of Bus. & Prorl Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 146
(1994) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761,771 (1993)).
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lator is required to justify mandating certain information be disclosed in
connection with commercial speech.89
But even applying the greater deference to government judgments
that commercial speech has the potential to deceive will not obviously
validate many modern disclosure requirements regulators impose to ful-
fill objectives other than preventing consumers from being misled by
uncorrected speech. That is, graphic cigarette warnings, calorie counts on
fast food, and statements about the adverse environmental impact of the
products on which they appear do not counter commercial speech the
Court would find has a self-evident "tendency to mislead." 90 Conse-
quently, were the Court to limit Zauderer's deferential review to disclo-
sure requirements that serve the purpose of preventing actual or potential
consumer deception, the remaining three prongs of the Central Hudson
test would become relevant to determining the constitutionality of the
many disclosure requirements that serve other regulatory purposes.
2. Substantial Purpose
Central Hudson's second prong requires the government to estab-
lish a "substantial" purpose for its regulation.9' It is in this purpose in-
quiry where a majority of the justices have drawn a sharp line between
unconstitutional and permissible commercial speech regulations. Early
on, the Court rejected what it characterized as the "highly paternalistic
approach" of restricting commercial speech to protect people from "the
reactions it is assumed [they] will have to the free flow of. .. informa-
tion. 92 Specifically, governments have often sought to achieve their va-
lid regulatory objective of reducing demand for a product by imposing
advertising restrictions on its producers. Governments' reasons for re-
ducing demand may be to promote public health,93 to conserve scarce
resources,94 to stabilize economic activity, 95 or to limit the spread of
"vice" activity.96 In each instance, the government regulator reasoned
that the advertising it restricted, if allowed, would influence consumer
89. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1340 (2010) (quot-
ing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53).
90. Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1340 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53); see, e.g., Nat'l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2001) (observing that the requirement that products
containing mercury disclose it served the purposes of providing information and protecting the
environment, not preventing consumers from being deceived).
91. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
92. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70
(1976).
93. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (reducing underage smok-
ing); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion) (reducing
alcohol consumption).
94. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 560 (conserving electricity).
95. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977) (preventing
"white flight" and blight).
96. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 182, 185
(1999) (noting that the Fifth Circuit labeled gambling as "vice activity").
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
activity in a way that would undermine the public interest, even if many
of the individual decisions based on unrestricted advertising might in fact
be in the rational self interest of the individual decisionmaker. 97 That is,
governments have sought to modify consumer behavior because they
have determined that the result of aggregated self interested individual
purchasing behavior would undermine a public interest.
Although the Court has acknowledged that regulating to modify
consumer purchasing behavior to achieve a public purpose is within gov-
ernments' legitimate authority, it has emphasized that it will view such
regulations with great skepticism when they take the form of speech re-
strictions. Restricting speech is a constitutionally offensive means of
achieving the government's legitimate citizen "protectiveness" objective
because its effectiveness "rests . . . on the advantages of their [citizens]
being kept in ignorance." 98 With increasing vehemence, the Court and
individual justices have condemned the "paternalistic assumption that the
public will use truthful, nonmisleading information unwisely," and the
Court has invalidated speech-suppressing regulations that are based upon
that assumption.99 The alternative that the Constitution requires speech
restrictions based on the "offensive assumption that the public will re-
spond 'irrationally' to the truth"'0° is to "open the channels of communi-
cation" so that people can be "well enough informed" to "perceive their
own best interests."10'
It is unclear precisely which characteristics of a regulation must ex-
ist for particular justices to label a government regulation as unconstitu-
tionally "paternalistic." All of the regulations condemned by the Court
on this basis have restricted commercial speech and some of the trouble-
some characteristics noted by the Court and individual justices are spe-
cific to speech restraints.102 One troublesome characteristic is that speech
restraints modify consumer behavior by "keep[ing] people in the dark for
... their own good." 103 Another is a political process concern that re-
stricting speech "to pursue a nonspeech-related policy" may "screen
from public view the underlying government policy."' 4 Additionally, the
Court continues to emphasize that disclosure requirements are a "far less
97. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 387 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("IThe Government fears the safety consequences ...[that] flow from the adverse cumulative
effects of multiple individual decisions each of which may seem perfectly reasonable considered on
its own.").
98. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769
(1976).
99. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497 (1996) (plurality opinion).
100. Id. at 503 (quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96
(1977)).
101. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
102. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193
(1999).
103. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503.
104. Id. at 500 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980)).
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restrictive alternative" than advertising restrictions, although it is unclear
the extent to which this conclusion extends beyond correcting "mislead-
ing" advertisements.'
0 5
By contrast, some statements by individual justices and combina-
tions of justices suggest a view that the Constitution prohibits the more
general regulation of commercial speech for "paternalistic" behavior
modification purposes.' ° 6 Justice Thomas has most vociferously advo-
cated the view that strict scrutiny should apply to government regulations
that depend on the content of commercial speech, unless the government
can demonstrate that the speech is untruthful or misleading.'0 7 Other jus-
tices have joined in similar reasoning in some cases.10 8 Nevertheless,
these justices and others have also emphasized that such content based
purposes are particularly problematic in the context of broad speech re-
strictions, which they characterized as "blanket bans" that "entirely sup-
press" speech,' ° 9 and that governments may require the disclosure of at
least some types of "beneficial consumer information" without running
afoul of the anti-paternalistic purpose rule that they interpret the Consti-
tution to contain." 0 Consequently, it is unclear how a majority of the
Court would evaluate a disclosure requirement aimed to counter the po-
tentially persuasive, as opposed to deceptive, content of commercial
speech under Central Hudson's second prong.
105. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) ("Even if the Government
did argue that it had an interest in preventing misleading advertisements, this interest could be satis-
fied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled with a
warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown.").
106. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342 (2010) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring); Thompson, 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas,
J., concurring).
108. 44 L~iquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("[W]hen a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands."). By contrast, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined Justice
Breyer's dissent in Thompson, accepting the Federal Drug Administration's consumer demand
modification purpose for restricting compounded drug advertising. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 382
(Breyer, J., dissenting). This may be because the FDA's restrictions were tailored and not a "com-
plete ban."
109. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500 (plurality opinion) ("'[SIpecial care' should
attend the review of ... blanket bans .. ") (citing Cent. Hudson, 447 at 566 n.9); Peel v. Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of I1l., 496 U.S. 91, 110 n.17 (1990) (plurality opinion) ("[A]
holding that a total ban is unconstitutional does not necessarily preclude less restrictive regulation of
commercial speech."); Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9 ("We review with special care regulations
that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeech-related policy.").
110. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion) ("When a State regulates commercial
messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires
the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than
strict review.").
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3. Directly Advance
Prong three of the Central Hudson test looks to the relationship of
the government's means to its end."' Speech restrictions must directly
advance the government's substantial purpose for imposing the regula-
tion. 12 The Court has applied this test with increasing rigor, questioning
the details of government line-drawing and demanding proof that par-
ticular restrictions will actually advance the government objective sub-
stantially.' 13 Where government has imposed speech restrictions for the
purpose of reducing demand as the intermediary means to achieving a
public end, the Court has examined closely whether the restriction im-
posed will actually achieve the specific type of demand reduction the
government asserts. In 44 Liquormart, a four justice plurality refused to
assume, without findings of fact or evidentiary support, that restricting
price advertising of alcohol would "significantly reduce alcohol con-
sumption," finding, among other things, that a lack of such information is
unlikely to deter heavy drinkers.1 4 In both Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States
115 and Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,116
the Court rejected the one-step-at-a-time reasoning, failing to find a close
enough fit between the government's purpose and its means because of
contradictions contained in the overall regulatory schemes for alcohol
and gambling, respectively.' 17 And in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,"
l8
a plurality similarly rejected the state's assertion that requiring tobacco
advertising be at five feet or higher directly advanced its goal of curbing
minors' demand for cigarettes because, "Not all children are less than 5
feet tall, and those who are certainly have the ability to look up and take
in their surroundings." ' 19 Finally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center, 20 the Court seemed to say that restricting advertisements to re-
duce consumer demand as a means to protect those same consumers
"from making bad decisions with the information" per se does not di-
rectly advance the government's interest.'2' Obviously, this close exami-
nation of means-end fit applied to disclosure requirements would invali-
date more of them than the Zauderer rational basis review.
111. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505.
114. Id. (requiring a strong showing by the State because of the "drastic nature of its chosen
means").
115. 527 U.S. 173(1999).
116. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
117. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 190-93; Rubin, 514 U.S. at 489.
118. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
119. Id. at 566 (plurality opinion).
120. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
121. Id. at 374-76 ("Even if the Government had asserted an interest in preventing people who
do not need compounded drugs from obtaining those drugs, the statute does not directly advance that
interest.... [Tihe statute does not directly forbid such sales. It instead restricts advertising, of course
not just to those who do not need compounded drugs, but also to individuals who do need com-
pounded drugs and their doctors.").
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4. Alternate Means
When it reaches the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the
Court inquires whether the regulation is "more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve [the government's] interest." 12 The Court has applied this
requirement increasingly rigorously as well, looking both to whether the
restriction imposed is well tailored to the government's purpose, 123 and
to whether alternative types of regulations that do not restrict speech
could adequately accomplish the government's objective. 124 According to
the Court, "[R]egulating speech must be a last-not first-resort."'' 25 A
number of speech restrictions imposed to reduce consumer demand have
failed this fourth prong inquiry. 126 The Court has consistently indicated
that direct, non-speech regulations are preferable to advertising restric-
tions, 127 although it has also recited more narrowly tailored speech re-
strictions as available alternatives that cause the regulation under review
to fail the fourth prong inquiry.128 In connection with this inquiry, the
Court has frequently mentioned that disclosure requirements are constitu-
tionally preferable, less-restrictive means to speech suppression,' 29 and
that governments are free to engage in their own speech to counter the
content of advertisements.1 30 Consequently, the extent to which the Court
would invalidate disclosure requirements because even less restrictive
122. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
123. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 563 ("The uniformly broad sweep of the geographical limitation
demonstrates a lack of tailoring.").
124. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 371 ("In previous cases addressing this final prong of the Central
Hudson test, we have made clear that if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.").
125. ld. at 373.
126. Id. at 371 (prescription drugs); Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (cigarettes); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,490-91 (1995) (alcohol).
127. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 372 ("Several non-speech-related means of drawing a line between
compounding and large-scale manufacturing [of drugs] might be possible here."); Rubin, 514 U.S. at
490-91 (one alternative available to prohibiting alcohol content advertising of beer is "directly
limiting the alcohol content of beers"); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507
(1996) ("[H]igher prices [for alcohol] can be maintained either by direct regulation or by increased
taxation."); Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (financial incen-
tives to reduce home sales are an available alternative to restricting display of For Sale signs).
128. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490-91 (alternatives to alcohol content advertising for all beer are
"prohibiting marketing efforts emphasizing high alcohol strength (which is apparently the policy in
some other western nations), or limiting the labeling ban only to malt liquors, which is the segment
of the market that allegedly is threatened with a strength war").
129. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 376; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980) (reasoning that in order to address its interest in promoting energy
conservation, the government "might, for example, require that the [utility's] advertisements include
information about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service"); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) ("[Tlhe preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less."); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (sug-
gesting that governments may "require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include
such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being decep-
tive").
130. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977) (suggesting the
alternative of government counter-speech).
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means of achieving the government's purpose are available, such as di-
rect regulation or government speech, is unclear.
C. Disclosure Requirements in the Lower Courts
The intersection of the Court's early distinction between commer-
cial speech disclosure requirements and restraints imposed on commer-
cial speech creates a number of open issues with respect to government
authority to mandate speech on product labels.
1. What is the test?
Lower courts have differed as to whether Zauderer's rational basis
review applies to all instances where governments mandate disclosure of
commercial information, or whether it is limited to instances where gov-
ernments act for the purpose of preventing consumer deception.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed this question in
a series of recent cases. In International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy
(IDFA),13 1 Judges Altimari and McLaughlin held for a two-judge major-
ity that dairy marketers had established a likelihood of success on the
merits of their claim that a Vermont statutory requirement mandating
producers to label certain dairy products-those made from milk derived
from cows treated with the synthetic growth hormone rBST-violated
the Constitution.1 32 The court applied the Central Hudson test to find the
disclosure requirement likely unconstitutional for lack of a substantial
purpose without explicitly addressing whether Zauderer's rational basis
test applied. 133 Judge Leval dissented, also without specifically distin-
guishing between the tests offered in Central Hudson and Zauderer.
134
Instead, he argued both that the state's interests were substantial under
Central Hudson, and that Zauderer's distinction between "disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech" rendered the Vermont
requirement constitutional.1
35
Five years later, in National Electrical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Sor-
rell,136 a unanimous panel composed of Chief Judge Walker, Judge Poo-
ler and then-Judge Sonia Sotomayor reversed and remanded a district
court decision and ordered preliminarily enjoining application of Ver-
mont statutory and regulatory requirements that manufacturers label
products to indicate they contain mercury and must be disposed of as
hazardous waste.137 The district court relied on the prior decision in
131. 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996).
132. Id. at 74.
133. Implicitly, the court seemed to limit Zauderer's application to disclosure requirements
aimed at "preventing deception of consumers." Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
134. Id. at 77-78 (Leval, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 81.
136. 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001).
137. Jd. at 116.
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IDFA and, applying Central Hudson, found the plaintiff manufacturers'
association likely to succeed on the merits of its constitutional claim.
138
The circuit court directly addressed the different tests articulated in Cen-
tral Hudson and Zauderer, and held that the district court had "misper-
ceived" which one applied to the disclosure requirement in that case.
39
According to the court, the Free Speech Clause objectives underlying the
distinction between disclosure requirements and restraints on speech
meant that the "reasonable-relationship rule in Zauderer" governed re-
view of the disclosure requirement before it, even though it "was not
intended to prevent 'consumer confusion or deception' per se."14 The
court explained:
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from re-
strictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of ac-
curate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First
Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information
or protecting individual liberty interests. Such disclosure furthers, ra-
ther than hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth
and contributes to the efficiency of the "marketplace of ideas." Pro-
tection of the robust and free flow of accurate information is the prin-
cipal First Amendment justification for protecting commercial
speech, and requiring disclosure of truthful information promotes that
goal. In such a case, then, less exacting scrutiny is required than
where truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is restricted.
Additionally, the individual liberty interests guarded by the First
Amendment, which may be impaired when personal or political
speech is mandated by the state are not ordinarily implicated by
compelled commercial disclosure. Required disclosure of accurate,
factual commercial information presents little risk that the state is
forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions,
suppressing dissent, confounding the speaker's attempts to participate
in self-governance, or interfering with an individual's right to define
and express his or her own personality.
41
The court thus concluded that "Zauderer, not [Central Hudson], de-
scribe[d] the relationship between means and ends demanded by the First
Amendment in compelled commercial disclosure cases. The Central
Hudson test should be applied to statutes that restrict commercial
speech."'142 It distinguished its prior decision in IDFA as "expressly lim-
ited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no
interest other than the gratification of 'consumer curiosity,"' noting that
"because our decision in IDFA was predicated on the state's inability to
138. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 72 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456. (D. Vt. 1999).
139. Sorrell, 272F.3dat 113.
140. Id. at 115 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
141. Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 115.
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identify a sufficient legitimate state interest, we did not reach the proper
relationship between a disclosure regulation's means and its ends, the
issue we face here."'' 43 It commented as well that applying the Central
Hudson test to government disclosure requirements not aimed specifi-
cally at preventing consumer deception would "expose [many] long-
established programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts. Such a
result is neither wise nor constitutionally required."'
44
In a later decision, with the panel again including Judge Poole and
then-Judge Sotomayor, the court rejected the New York State Restaurant
Association's (NYSRA) argument that New York City's requirement
that restaurants post the calorie content of food should be reviewed under
the Central Hudson test because its purpose was to combat obesity rather
than prevent consumer deception, and because the plaintiff association
disputed that the disclosure requirement would fulfill that purpose.' 45 The
court reiterated its Sorrell reasoning "that Zauderer's holding was broad
enough to encompass nonmisleading disclosure requirements"1 46 and that
"Zauderer, not Central Hudson .. .describes the relationship between
means and ends demanded by the First Amendment in compelled com-
"'47mercial disclosure cases.
The Second Circuit panel noted that "[w]e have not been alone in
accepting this broader reading,"1 48 citing the First Circuit's decision in
Pharmaceutical Care Management Ass'n v. Rowe. 14 9 In that case, the
court applied Zauderer to Maine's statutory requirement that middlemen
entities in the pharmaceutical distribution network disclose certain in-
formation about their operations and finances as a condition for doing
business in the state.'50 The court rejected plaintiff's argument that "Zau-
derer is 'limited to potentially deceptive advertising directed at consum-
ers,"' noting that it had "found no cases limiting Zauderer in such a
way.' 5' The weight of the lower court precedent, therefore, interprets
the Zauderer rational basis test to apply to disclosure requirements gen-
143. Id. at 115 n.6.
144. Id. at 116 (noting that "[jinnumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the
disclosure of product and other commercial information," including reporting of federal election
campaign contributions, securities disclosures, tobacco labeling, nutritional labeling, reporting of
pollutant concentrations in water, reporting of releases of toxic substances, disclosures in prescrip-
tion drug advertisements, posting notification of workplace hazards, warning of potential exposure to
hazardous substances, and disclosure of pesticide formulas) (citations omitted).
145. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 132-33 (2d.
Cir. 2009).
146. Id. at 133.
147. Id. (quoting Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 115) (alteration in original).
148. NYSRA, 556 F.3d at 133
149. 429 F.3d 294 (1st Cir. 2005).
150. Id. at 316.
151. Id. at 310 n.8.
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erally, even if they are not specifically or exclusively aimed at preventing
consumer deception.'
52
Other courts, however, have applied the Central Hudson test to dis-
closure requirements, specifically in the context of advertising by law-
yers and other professionals, where the Court's decision in Ibanez mud-
dies the precedent. In Borgner v. Brooks,5 3 the case in which Justices
Thomas and Ginsburg dissented from denial of the writ of certiorari,
154
both the district court and the appellate court applied the Central Hudson
test to a state requirement that dentists include a disclaimer with their
advertisements of an implant dentistry specialty.15 5 Neither acknowl-
edged the option of lower level review that Zauderer presented.
56
In Mason v. Florida Bar,1 57 the Eleventh Circuit confronted a state
bar rule that on its face prohibited attorneys from making certain types of
"self laudatory" statements without a lengthy disclaimer in the lawyer's
advertising. 58 Confronted with the state bar's argument that "its restric-
tion on [the plaintiff attorney's] speech should be upheld because it has
not insisted upon an outright ban on speech, but merely requires the use
of a disclaimer,"' 59 the court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in
Ibanez to require that "[elven partial restrictions on commercial speech
must be supported by a showing of some identifiable harm."' 6 It held
"that the Bar is not relieved of its burden to identify a genuine threat of
152. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Assoc. v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286-87 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding that for review of a required disclosure for bankruptcy attorneys "the reasonable relation test
is more appropriate," but also determining that the required disclosures are not misleading, are not
overbroad, and "advance[] a sufficiently compelling government interest and do[] not unduly burden
the attorney-client relationship"); European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1371-72 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("IMBRA's disclosure requirements are properly analyzed under
Zauderer and must be upheld if there is a reasonable relationship to a legitimate government inter-
est .... IMBRA's disclosure requirements are reasonably related to Congress' legitimate interest in
preventing fraud and deception and addressing domestic abuse and human trafficking against so-
called 'mail-order brides."'); Beeman v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., Inc., No. EDCV 04-407-VAP
(SGLx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39779, at *36-39 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2007) (addressing the question
whether strict scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny applied to state statutory requirement that pharma-
cies conduct and distribute a bi-yearly rice survey, and concluding that no scrutiny applied because
the statistics were not required to be distributed with advertising materials and so did not burden
commercial speech); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 845 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003) (subject-
ing EPA rule that requires municipalities to distribute information about the hazards of storm water
run-off to unspecific low level scrutiny); Texans Against Censorship, Inc. v. State Bar of Tex., 888
F. Supp. 1328, 1357-59 (E.D. Tex. 1995), affd, 100 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1996).
153. 284 F.3d 1204 (11 th Cir. 2002).
154. Borgner v. Fla. Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. Borgner, 284 F.3d at 1210.
156. Id. at 1214 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) for the rule that "[d]isclaimers are significantly different than out-
right bans on commercial speech," but applying the Central Hudson test); Borgner v. Brooks, 152 F.
Supp. 2d 1317, 1324 (2001) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 648-49 for the rule that restrictions on
advertising cannot be based on "'unsupported assertions' without 'evidence or authority of any
kind"').
157. 208 F.3d 952 (11 th Cir. 2000).
158. Id. at 954.
159. Id. at 958.
160. Id.
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danger simply because it requires a disclaimer, rather than a complete
ban on ... speech," and that the Bar "has failed to satisfy the third prong
of Central Hudson."'6 1 Similarly, the district court in Schwartz v.
Welch 162 reviewed a series of disclosure requirements imposed on lawyer
advertising under the Central Hudson test, characterizing the rules as
imposing "restrictions" because the requirements caused the lawyer-
plaintiffs to modify their advertisements and forego certain advertise-
ment techniques.' 63 A Massachusetts state court recently discussed the
difficulty of analyzing disclosure requirements coupled with an enforce-
ment mechanism present in the context of mandated security offering
registration and disclosure. 164 The problem of characterization arises
because the disclosure requirement serves "not to restrict speech, but to
expand it," but the "necessary corollary" of such a scheme is the prohibi-
tion of speech without the required disclaimer. 65 The enforcement me-
chanism "inherently restrict[s] speech," but "without such prohibitions it
is difficult to imagine how a ... disclosure system could operate with
any degree of effectiveness."'
' 66
In Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 167 the district
court applied the Central Hudson test to a disclaimer imposed on law-
yers. 168 The appellate court agreed that Zauderer applied only to disclo-
sure requirements imposed for the purpose of preventing deception, but
applied that test because it determined that this was the government's
purpose in that case. 169 The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
reasoning,17  which meant that it did not resolve whether Zauderer's
"less exacting scrutiny" applies to disclosure requirements imposed for
purposes other than correcting potentially deceptive commercial speech.
Additionally, although the case before it did not depend upon the distinc-
tion, the Ninth Circuit recently appears to have assumed that the decep-
tion prevention purpose is essential to the application of the Zauderer
standard. 7'
161. Id.
162. 890 F. Supp. 565 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
163. Id. at 573-74.
164. Bulldog Investors Gen. P'ship v. Galvin, No. 07-1261-BLS2, 2007 WL 4647112, at *9-
*10 (Mass. Dec. 26, 2007).
165. Id. at *9- 10.
166. Id. at *10.
167. 541 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2008).
168. Id. at 796.
169. Id. at 796 ("[Rlestrictions on non-deceptive advertising are reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny.... The district court in this case reviewed § 528's disclosure requirements under the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, but we conclude that rational basis review is proper. The disclosure
requirements here, like those in Zauderer, are intended to avoid potentially deceptive advertising.").
170. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (apply-
ing the deferential review of Zauderer because the statute imposed a disclosure requirement and
because it "is directed at misleading commercial speech").
171. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966 (9th Cir. 2009)
("Compelled disclosures, justified by the need to 'dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or
deception,' are permissible if the 'disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's inter-
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2. Can The Purpose Be "Paternalistic"?
The "paternalism" the Court condemns in the speech restraint cases
involves a three-step ends/means continuum: (1) a government agency
suppresses speech (2) to modify individual buyer/seller transactions (3)
to achieve a public purpose, which is something other than preventing
consumer deception. Steps two and three are commonplace aims of le-
gitimate non-speech regulatory actions. It is the very essence of regula-
tion to restrict the freedom of individual marketplace actors in some in-
stances to serve the democratic government's conception of the public
interest. The many types of public interests served by these actions are
not exclusively, or even primarily, preventing consumer deception.
As noted above, a number of courts have rejected claims by vendors
that Zauderer's rational basis review is limited to disclosure require-
ments that are intended to protect consumers from deception. 172 These
courts have reasoned that the "free flow of information" value that un-
derpins the protection of commercial speech must extend to render a
government's purpose to provide more information to aid fully informed
consumer decision-making legitimate, even if the regulator did not im-
pose the disclosure requirement to correct affirmatively deceptive or
misleading vendor speech. 173 Extended this far, the reasoning remains
consistent with that articulated by the Court in condemning "paternalis-
tic" speech restraints. 174 Many existing disclosure requirements can be
characterized as intended simply to provide additional information,
which will assist consumers in making decisions that reflect their own
rational self-interests and which the consumers would not know was in
their interest without government mandated disclosure. Requirements
that vendors label products as kosher, 175 as containing ingredients to
which certain consumers may have an allergic reaction, 76 or with safe
handling advice 177 fall into this category.
But many disclosure requirements have purposes that extend be-
yond merely facilitating the exercise of each individual consumer's ra-
est in preventing deception of customers."' (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 131-171.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 131-17 1.
174. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (less than strict
judicial review is appropriate when states "require[] the disclosure of beneficial consumer informa-
tion").
175. See, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTs. LAW §§ 201-a(l), 201-c(l), invalidated by Commack
Self-Service Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Weiss, 294 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (establishment clause viola-
tion).
176. See, e.g., Food Allergen Labeling and Consumer Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
282, 118 Stat. 905, 905-11 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/FoodAllergensLabeling/GuidanceComplianceRegulator
ytnformation/ucm 106187.htm.
177. See, e.g., Mandatory Safe Handling Statements on Labeling of Raw Meat and Poultry
Products, 9 C.F.R. §§ 317.2, 317.5, 381.125, 381.134 (1994).
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tional self-interest. Often, government regulators impose disclosure re-
quirements for the purpose of modifying the "reactions" that they antici-
pate consumers will have to un-supplemented advertiser information.
78
Regulators require disclosure because of "a fear that people would make
bad decisions" if given only the information provided by the vendors.
179
That is, an explicit government purpose is to change individual product
purchasing behavior to implement a judgment about "what the govern-
ment perceives to be their own good,"'180 or, often, and more specifically,
what the government has determined is in the public good.
Labeling requirements may be part of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that makes clear the consumer behavior modification objective.
Cigarette package labeling requirements exist within a complex structure
of many different federal, state, and local regulations, including direct
marketing restrictions, taxes, and public education efforts aimed at serv-
ing the public interest in reducing demand for a product that results in
high social and economic costs."' An explicit strategy of cigarette regu-
lations is to change public attitudes about the desirability of the prod-
uct-to "denormalize" tobacco use.
182
Similar multi-level and multi-faceted regulatory structures with the
underlying agenda of changing public attitudes and purchasing behavior
exist with respect to other products governments have identified as caus-
ing harms to public health and resulting in high social and economic
costs. 183 While a requirement that food manufacturers label products with
sodium, sugar, or transfat can be characterized as a government effort to
"open the channels of communication," another, more aggressive, pur-
pose is obvious as well. Each requirement is part of a broader strategy to
promote healthy food consumption, not just any food consumption ra-
tional consumers may happen to choose. And the judgment of what con-
stitutes "healthy" food consumption can be controversial. ' 84 Conse-
quently, many existing labeling requirements depend upon government
authority to require disclosure of information because of the "reactions"
178. See Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of "False" Is: Falsity and Mis-
leadingness in Commercial Speech Doctrine, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 227, 250 & n.107 (2007) (dis-
cussing the "preference-shaping effects" of labeling requirements).
179. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002).
180. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
181. See, e.g., TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO:
IMPACT ON STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY (2009), available at http://publichealthlawcenter.org/
topics/tobacco-controU/federal-regulation-tobacco/federa-reguation-tobacco-collection.
182. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing
campaign of California Department of Health Services "to 'denormalize' smoking, by creating a
climate in which smoking would seem less desirable and less socially acceptable.").
183. See, e.g., Penny Starr, First Lady Links Childhood Obesity to National Security in Launch
of 'Let's Move' Campaign, CNSNEwS.COM, Feb. 09, 2010, http://cnsnews.comnewslarticle/61157
(describing elements of anti-obesity campaign).
184. See, e.g., John Tierney, Diet and Fat: A Severe Case of Mistaken Consensus, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2007, at FI (describing controversy about USDA Food Pyramid and advice to eat a low-fat
diet), available at http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Economics/Diet%20and%2OFat.pdf.
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it presumes consumers will have to un-supplemented information and for
the purpose of modifying consumer behavior to serve the government's
determination of the public interest.
185
The Second Circuit's three cases all involve labeling requirements
where a government purpose to modify behavior is mixed with the pur-
pose to inform. In IDFA, the panel invalidated a Vermont requirement
that milk manufacturers disclose use of the hormone rBST. t 86 Vermont
passed the law because its citizens wanted to know the information.'
87
The court held that "consumer curiosity" was not enough to justify im-
posing the disclosure requirement on the producer's commercial
speech. 88 As the dissent pointed out, milk producers vigorously opposed
the labeling requirement because of the reaction they feared consumers
would have to it. 189 The milk producers also successfully argued that the
information provided should have no impact on a reasonable consumer,
because consumers should only be concerned about health effects of the
hormone on the milk product, and that had not been scientifically dem-
onstrated.' 9° That is, milk producers were concerned that consumers
would react irrationally to the information provided at purchase of the
product, despite the fact that the vendors remained free to provide what-
ever contrary information they wanted, at either that moment or in other
advertising. 19 1 Specifically, the milk producers conceded the powerful
persuasive effect of information provided at the product purchase mo-
ment. By requiring that the government provide a particular showing of
harm in order to require disclosure, the majority interpreted the First
Amendment as granting the milk producers a right of "concealment" in
order to present their persuasive product messages in their own way.192
The milk labeling controversy helps make clear that what is at stake on
185. Regulators may also seek to influence producer behavior through imposition of labeling
requirements because of the anticipated consumer behavior modification effect. When threatened
with an upcoming trans fat labeling requirements many food producers abandoned using them to
avoid the anticipated reaction of consumers to the disclosure. See, e.g., LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DuTY, RESTRAINT 177 (2000) (describing decision of Kraft Foods to
remove trans fats from Oreo cookies in anticipation of mandatory labeling); Elise Golan, Fred Ku-
chler & Barry Krissoff, Do Food Labels Make a Difference?... Sometimes, AMBER WAVES, Nov.
2007, http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/Scripts/print.asppage=/November07/Features/
FoodLabels.htm.
186. Manufacturers could comply with the law by placing a small blue sticker on their milk, in
conjunction with a sign posted by the retailers indicating that the sticker marked hormone-exposed
milk. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1996).
187. Id. at 75-76 (Leval, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 74 (majority opinion) ("[W]e hold that consumer curiosity alone is not a strong
enough state interest to sustain the compulsion of even an accurate, factual statement in a commer-
cial context.") (citation omitted).
189. See id. at 80 (Leval, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 73 (majority opinion) ("[Tihe already extensive record in this case contains no
scientific evidence.., that rBST has any impact at all on dairy products.").
191. Id. at 80 (Leval, J., dissenting) ("[The manufacturers] do not wish consumers to know that
their milk products were produced by use of rBST because there are consumers who, for various
reasons, prefer to avoid rBST.").
192. See id. at 74, 80.
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both sides of the argument about the extent of government authority to
impose disclosure requirements is the power to influence to modify con-
sumer behavior, not simply to inform it.
The Second Circuit in Sorrell directly acknowledged the consumer
behavior modification objective of the disclosure requirement.' 93 The
"overall goal" of the requirement that manufacturers label products con-
taining mercury with content and proper disposal information was not
simply to inform consumers so that they could decide upon their own
rational self-interests and pursue them. Rather, it was "plainly" to pursue
the additional public interest in "reduc[ing] the amount of mercury re-
leased into the environment."'' 94 This purpose, the court noted, was "in-
extricably intertwined with the goal of increasing consumer awareness of
the presence of mercury in a variety of products."' 195 Increasing public
awareness through mandated disclosure had the purpose of "encouraging
... changes in consumer behavior."' 96 Although the "change" the court
referred to was in consumers' product disposal behavior, it is not hard to
imagine that the required mercury content disclosures were also for the
purpose of reducing demand for mercury containing products as well.
The court nevertheless explicitly recited the linkage of disclosure re-
quirements, consumer behavior change, and fulfillment of the govern-
ment purpose as appropriate to demonstrate the reasonable ends-means
relationship required by the Zauderer test.1
97
More recently, in reviewing calorie content disclosure requirements
imposed on New York restaurants, the same court found these means
rationally related to the city's purpose "to promote informed consumer
decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associated with
it.'' 198 Although the court noted that the city was not obliged to produce
evidence to support its decision-making under the rational basis review
applied, it listed much of the evidence the city chose to produce showing
that obesity is a public health problem, that obesity correlates to eating in
restaurants, and that "calorie information is most relevant to obesity pre-
vention."' 99 The court thus concluded that the "calorie disclosure rules
are clearly reasonably related to [the city's] goal of reducing obesity."
2 °




197. Id. ("By encouraging such changes in consumer behavior, the labeling requirement is
rationally related to the state's goal of reducing mercury contamination.").
198. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir.
2009).
199. Id. at 136 (quoting ThE KEYSTONE FORUM ON AWAY-FROM-HOME FOODS:
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PREVENTING WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY (2006)), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutritionlReportsResearch/ucm082064.htm.
200. NYSRA, 556 F.3d at 136.
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These cases illustrate that the "purpose" behind modem labeling re-
quirements is more complex than the discussions in the speech restraint
cases may suggest. Regulators mandate disclosure both to provide infor-
mation, in the hope that consumers will modify their purchasing behavior
to align with the public interest, and to persuade them to view the public
interest as their own. The government's means of achieving behavior
modification is what is importantly different between the speech restraint
and speech disclosure cases. The "paternalism" of regulating to modify
consumer behavior to achieve a public interest remains the same.
3. Can the Information Be Selected and Presented to Persuade?
The Court in Zauderer distinguished unconstitutional compulsions
that individuals publicize or recite ideological government messages
from the requirement that the attorney include "purely factual and uncon-
troversial information" with his own commercial speech . Several
courts have evaluated disclosure requirements against this standard,
reaching different conclusions as to whether the disclosure requirement
was unconstitutionally persuasive.
The Seventh Circuit accepted this argument in striking down an Il-
linois statute that required distributors to place a four square inch "18"
label on "sexually explicit" video games, and to post signs and distribute
brochures explaining the rating system. 2 The state's purpose for the
regulation was "shielding children from indecent sexual material and in
assisting parents in protecting their children from that material., 203 The
court rejected the state's contention that the contents of the label and
signage were similar to the required disclosure of mercury content in
lights, which was upheld by the Second Circuit in Sorrell:
With regard to the "18" sticker requirement, this argument seems to
be plainly unsound. The [state statute] requires that the "18" sticker
be placed on games that meet the statute's definition of "sexually ex-
plicit." The State's definition of this term is far more opinion-based
than the question of whether a particular chemical is within any given
product. Even if one assumes that the State's definition of "sexually
explicit" is precise, it is the State's definition-the video game manu-
facturer or retailer may have an entirely different definition of this
term. Yet the requirement that the "18" sticker be attached to all
games meeting the State's definition forces the game-seller to include
this non-factual information in its message that is the game's packag-
ing. The sticker ultimately communicates a subjective and highly
controversial message-that the game's content is sexually explicit.
201. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
651 (1985).
202. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641,643 (7th Cir. 2006).
203. Id. at 646.
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This is unlike a surgeon general's warning of the carcinogenic prop-
erties of cigarettes, the analogy the State attempts to draw.
204
Because it found the speech to be ideological, the court applied
strict scrutiny to invalidate it as not narrowly tailored. It reached the
same conclusions with respect to the signs and brochures explaining the
rating system, finding in addition that these items unconstitutionally re-
quired sellers to "communicate endorsement of the [Entertainment Soft-
ware Rating Board], a non-governmental third party whose message may
be in conflict with that of any particular retailer. 2 0 5 The court did not
cite or distinguish the Supreme Court's decision in Meese, which upheld
a "propaganda" label on political speech,2°
Outside the context of video game labels, 20 7 courts have found se-
lective disclosure requirements to meet Zauderer's "factual and uncon-
troversial" requirement. For example, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a chal-
lenge by municipal units to an EPA rule that required, as a condition to
receiving a permit to discharge waste into waterways, that they "distrib-
ute educational materials to the community" about the dangers of storm
water runoff.2 °8 The court found that "[i]nforning the public about safe
toxin disposal is non-ideological.,, 209 The Second Circuit in NYSRA spe-
cifically addressed the restaurant association's claim that calorie disclo-
sure was unconstitutionally selective:
NYSRA does not contend that disclosure of calorie information is not
"factual"; it only claims that its member restaurants do not want to
communicate to their customers that calorie amounts should be pri-
oritized among other nutrient amounts, such as those listed in [the]
Nutrition Fact panel. However, the First Amendment does not bar the
204. Id. at 652.
205. Id. at 653.
206. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-85 (1987); see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying
text. The Ninth Circuit invalidated a similar "18" labeling requirement for violent videos, finding it
inconsistent with "the factual information and deception prevention standards set forth in Zauderer"
after it held that the state could not constitutionally prohibit under 18 year olds from purchasing the
videos. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985)) ("Unless the Act can clearly and legally characterize a video game as 'violent' and not
subject to First Amendment protections, the '18' sticker does not convey factual information.")
(emphasis added).
207. That the product labeled is, itself, speech, muddies the analysis. See, e.g., Am. Amuse-
ment Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576-77 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that video games are
speech). Additionally, ratings systems present an intermediary step between the product information
and the information on the label, which makes the government's selective judgment about the infor-
mation provided more apparent.
208. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 848 (9th Cir. 2003).
209. Id. at 849-50 (analyzing EPA's administrative rules implementing the Clean Water Act
that require small municipal sewer systems that discharge waste to conduct public education efforts
about the effects of sewer discharges.); see also Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114
n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Our decision reaches only required disclosure of factual commercial informa-
tion [about mercury content]."); Conn. Bar Ass'n v. U.S., 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008)
("In contrast [to the cases involving compelled dissemination of ideological speech], the required
disclosures here are all facts about the bankruptcy process.").
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City from compelling such "under-inclusive" factual disclosures,
where.., the City's decision to focus its attention on calorie amounts
is rational.
210
Although they involve selective disclosures arguably crafted, at
least in part, to persuade, all of the disclosure requirements addressed by
the courts thus far have involved information that consumers likely
would not know without the disclosure. In challenging the new cigarette
labels, sellers argue that the graphic, colorful labels are more constitu-
tionally offensive because they present information that consumers al-
ready know or could be brought to know in a far less eye-catching way,
and so are obviously crafted not to inform but to persuade. 21 The district
court disagreed, finding that "the government's goal is not to stigmatize
the use of tobacco products on the industry's dime; it is to ensure that the
health risk message is actually seen by consumers in the first in-
stance. 2 12 The court rejected the cigarette manufacturers' proposed
analogy to video game labeling, describing the message required to be
disclosed on the packages as "objective" and as having "not been contro-
versial for many decades. 21 3 As to the required addition of graphic im-
agery, the court said that it did "not believe that [it] will alter the sub-
stance of such messages, at least as a general rule."2t 4 Interestingly, in an
earlier part of the decision, the court accepted the cigarette manufactur-
ers' challenge to a portion of the statute that banned the use of color or
graphics in their labeling or advertising, finding that symbols and "some
uses of color" communicate information in a different, and potentially
more persuasive, way than the black and white text the statute re-
215quires.
II. THE ABORTION DISCLOSURE CASES
At the same time that it has been reviewing restrictions of commer-
cial speech more rigorously, the Court has been developing a jurispru-
dence of constitutionally permissible disclosure requirements in the con-
text of abortion. By contrast to the tightening of review of government
regulations and the mixed signals that fuel challenges to commercial
speech disclosure requirements, the abortion disclosure jurisprudence is
relatively unambiguous. In this line of cases, firm answers exist - either
in the Court's terse comments or in the lower courts' more lengthy appli-
210. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health (NYSRA), 556 F.3d 114, 134 (2d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).
211. Commonwealth Brands v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 531.
214. Id. at 532.
215. Id. at 525. The district court invalidated the "ban on color and graphics in labels and
advertising" for tobacco products under the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson, which re-
quire a "direct" and "no more extensive than is necessary" relationship between the end and means.
Id. at 521, 541.
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cations - to what seems like open questions in the commercial speech
line of cases.
A. The Supreme Court's Informed Consent to Abortion Cases
The abortion disclosure cases began immediately after Roe v.
Wade 2 16 established a constitutional right to choose abortion before fetal
viability.217 In the early cases after the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court
addressed the impact of informed consent provisions on a woman's pri-
vacy right, without discussing the impact of the requirements on abortion
providers' free speech rights.2t8 Under Roe's trimester framework, a state
could not impose a regulation that had a "significant impact on the wom-
an's exercise of her [abortion] right" 2 9 during the first three months of
pregnancy, and could not impose such a regulation for the purpose of
protecting fetal life until the third trimester. 22 Employing this analysis,
the Court reasoned that protecting the woman's health was the only pur-
pose that could support a mandatory information disclosure requirement,
and it scrutinized the pieces of information that states selected for disclo-
sure,221 invalidating disclosure requirements that it deemed "not relevant
to [informed] consent ' 222 and "designed to influence the woman's in-
formed choice between abortion or childbirth. 223
224In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a
majority of the Court modified its prior decision in Roe to acknowledge
the existence of a legitimate government interest in protecting fetal life
that attaches at the beginning of the pregnancy, and applied this revision
to uphold disclosure requirements indistinguishable from those it had
invalidated in prior cases.225 The plurality and concurring justices on this
issue wrote separately.226 Only the plurality addressed the abortion pro-
216. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
217. Id. at 164-65.
218. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kan. City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-91 (1983) (upholding a state consent statute which comported with Belotti II); Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti 1/), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (concluding a state could require parental consent but only if
the state also provides "an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the abortion can be
obtained"); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132, 145 (1976) (explaining that a state consent
statute may not create a "parental veto"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
69-70 (1976) (striking down a state statute requiring a husband's written consent).
219. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,430 (1983).
220. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977).
221. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 443 (clarifying that a state does not have "unreviewable author-
ity to decide what information a woman must be given before she chooses to have an abortion").
222. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763 (1986)
("Under the guise of informed consent, the Act requires the dissemination of information that is not
relevant to such consent, and, thus, it advances no legitimate state interest.").
223. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
224. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
225. Id. at 878.
226. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter announced the judgment of the Court and deliv-
ered a plurality opinion. Id. at 841. Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia and Thomas concurred in the
judgment that the disclosure requirement did not violate the due process clause, but would have
applied rational basis analysis to reach this result. Id. at 967-69.
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viders' Free Speech Clause claim. 227 While preserving the "essence of
the abortion right," the plurality rejected Roe's trimester framework rea-
soning and replaced it with an "undue burden" inquiry that applies to
state regulations imposed from the onset of the pregnancy.228 In deter-
mining that the disclosure requirements at issue did not impose an undue
burden on the abortion right, the plurality explicitly rejected prior Court
holdings that only a purpose to protect women's health could support
required disclosure. It held that states may select information and man-
date disclosure for the purpose of protecting fetal life and "to persuade
her to choose childbirth over abortion.,, 229 In discussing the required dis-
closures that may survive this undue burden analysis, the plurality twice
stated that the disclosures should be "truthful and not misleading., 230
After finding that the disclosure requirements imposed no unconsti-
tutional burden on the prospective abortion consumer, the Casey plurality
briefly addressed the abortion providers' claim that the mandated disclo-
sures violated their Free Speech Clause rights.23' The plurality first rea-
soned that the providers' claim acquired no heightened value because of
its articulation in the context of the protected abortion right. 232 With this
put aside, "[a]ll that is left of petitioners' argument is an asserted First
Amendment right of a physician not to provide information about the
risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. 233
The plurality reasoned:
To be sure, the physician's First Amendment rights not to speak are
implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State. We see no constitu-
tional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the in-
formation mandated by the State here.
234
227. Id. at 884 (concluding that an abortion provider's constitutional right "not to provide
information" extends "only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State").
228. Id. at 876 ("[T]he undue burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the
State's interest with the woman's constitutionally protected liberty.").
229. Id. at 878, 882-83 (asserting that governments may require that women considering
abortion receive information about "the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the
fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her health," and even when the
information provided "expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion").
230. Id. at 882 (prior cases went too far in invalidating disclosure of "truthful, nonmisleading
information").
231. Id. at 884.
232. Id. ("Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may have as a general
matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman's position. The doctor-patient relation
does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the abortion right is justified:
the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient
relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in other contexts. Thus, a requirement that a
doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for con-
stitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor give certain specific information
about any medical procedure.").
233. Id.
234. Id. (citations omitted).
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Although not specifically reviewing a disclosure requirement, the
Court later, in Gonzales v. Carhartz35 characterized its holding in Casey
to be that "[t]he government may use its voice and its regulatory author-
ity to show its profound respect for the life within the woman." 23 6 In ad-
dressing the question whether barring a type of procedure imposed an
undue burden on the right to choose abortion, in light of claims that it
was necessary in some circumstances to protect the health of abortion
consumers, it said, "The Court has given state and federal legislatures
wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and
scientific uncertainty.
237
B. Informed Consent in the Lower Courts-Issues and Answers
States have enacted a number of abortion disclosure requirements
since the Court's decision in Casey, and as the Court's commercial
speech and government speech jurisprudences have continued develop-
ing. Many of these "informed consent" provisions both go beyond in-
formation normally required by the informed consent doctrine and can
reasonably be interpreted as designed to persuade women not to choose
abortion.238 Lower courts have addressed the increasing Free Speech
Clause challenges brought by abortion providers to the disclosure re-
quirements, fleshing out Casey's few sentences to identify the standard
of review and analysis that apply to such claims.
1. The Test is Rational Basis
Lower courts have uniformly interpreted Casey to apply a "reason-
able relationship" test to claims by abortion providers that disclosure
requirements violate their free speech rights.239 Several courts have noted
that the level of review would change if states were to require doctors to
provide patients with state mandated "ideology" instead of factual dis-
closures.24° Many courts have noted and grafted onto the Free Speech
235. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
236. Id. at 157.
237. Id. at 163.
238. Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion
Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1609 (2008). According to a recent Guttmacher Institute report
17 states mandate that women be given "counseling" before an abortion that includes information on
at least one of the following: the purported link between abortion and breast cancer (6 states), the
ability of a fetus to feel pain (9 states), long-term mental health consequences for the woman (7
states) or information on the availability of ultrasound (8 states). Commentators argue that at least
some of these provisions should be interpreted to violate the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 1609-12; see
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV.
939, 1007-09 (2009) (provisions violate the fights of the listener); Robert Post, Informed Consent to
Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL L. REV. 939,
959 (2007) (provisions violate the right of the speaker).
239. This tracks the Court's language and brief analysis. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (doctors' speech subject to "reasonable... regulation by the State").
240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-35 (8th
Cir. 2008) ("Casey and Gonzales establish that the State cannot compel an individual simply to
speak the State's ideological message ... ").
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Clause test the additional requirement twice articulated by the Casey
plurality in its undue burden analysis that "permissible" disclosure re-
quirements must be "truthful and not misleading.,
241
This phraseology parallels language contained in several different
parts of its commercial speech jurisprudence. Central Hudson's first
prong requires that commercial speech be "lawful activity and not be
misleading" to earn entry into the protected category.242 And, as noted
above, lower courts have interpreted Zauderer to require that the content
of mandated disclosure requirements be "factual and uncontroversial. 243
The Supreme Court plurality did not make any of these connections, and
neither have the lower courts. No court has considered applying the full
tests set out in Central Hudson or Zauderer to state requirements that
doctors deliver state mandated information along with their own speech.
2. The Purpose Can Be "Paternalistic"
As to legitimate purposes that can support mandated disclosure re-
quirements, courts have applied as binding precedent the Casey plural-
ity's reasoning that either a purpose to protect maternal health or to pro-
tect the life of the unborn fetus will suffice.244 Protecting maternal health
is a purpose consistent with furthering the consumer's rational self inter-
est in self protection. Protecting the life of an unborn fetus is a purpose
that asks the abortion consumer to think beyond herself, to consider how
other beings, and one "being" in particular, will be affected by her deci-
sion to undergo the procedure. That is, despite some efforts by the Court
to cast it as a purpose that serves the woman's self interest,245 protecting
the life of the unborn fetus is a public purpose that may well conflict with
the consumer's rational self interest.
As explained above, the "paternalistic approach" that the Court
condemns in the context of commercial speech restraints involves the
combination of (1) restricting speech, (2) to reduce demand, (3) to serve
a public interest, which is something other than ensuring fully informed
and accurate consumer decision-making. 246 In holding that states may
constitutionally mandate disclosure, in a way "which might cause the
241. Id. at 746.
242. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
243. See supra Part I.C.3.
244. See, e.g., Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 495 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he district court con-
cluded that the provisions challenged... bore a reasonable relationship to the state's goal of promot-
ing childbirth over abortion .... [Tlhe district court went on to pronounce that 'were Casey not
binding, I might be inclined to hold that [the statute containing the disclosure requirements] was
passed with an impermissible purpose . . . . However, lower courts are bound by Supreme Court
precedent. I do not see how Casey does not control this question."') (third omission in original).
245. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (stating that informa-
tion about the fetus is relevant to a woman's "psychological well-being," which "is a facet of
health").
246. See supra Part I.C.2.
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woman to choose childbirth over abortion," and which was enacted for
,,247the purpose of "express[ing] a preference for childbirth over abortion,
the Court has held that steps two and three are constitutional when com-
bined with the means of required disclosure in the context of consumer
decision making with respect to the service of abortion.248 Lower courts
uniformly understand and apply this principle.
3. The Information Can Be Selected and Presented to Persuade
The Casey plurality was not ambiguous. 249 The lower courts have
interpreted its words to say that states may pursue their legitimate pur-
pose of protecting fetal life by requiring disclosure of information se-
lected to persuade potential abortion consumers to decide against the
procedure.250 They have also addressed claims by abortion providers that
particular state disclosure requirements go beyond the bounds of permis-
sible state persuasion authorized in Casey, either because they impart
ideology instead of information, or because the information required to
25!be disclosed is untruthful or misleading.
Lower courts have had to address the two prongs of the Casey plu-
rality's reasoning and to reconcile them with the particular statutory pro-
visions under review. These are, first, that the First Amendment would
prohibit a state from mandating that a private individual "simply . . .
speak the State's ideological message ' 252 and second, that the informa-
tional disclosures required by the Pennsylvania statute at issue in Casey,
even though, at least in part, "designed to persuade [women] to choose
childbirth over abortion," 253 did not do that. Although these courts have
reached different conclusions with respect to the application of Casey's
reasoning to particular types of provisions, they have generally inter-
preted the precedent to allow government regulators a wide range of dis-
cretion both to choose information that abortion providers must present
to potential consumers, and to direct the means of presentation in order
to further the public purpose of reducing demand for a lawful service.
247. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 878 (noting that a state measure may be "designed to persuade [a woman] to
choose childbirth over abortion").
250. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 735 (8th Cir. 2008) ("[A
State may] use its regulatory authority to require a physician to provide truthful, non-misleading
information relevant to a patient's decision to have an abortion, even if that information might also
encourage the patient to choose childbirth over abortion."); see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446,
495 (7th Cir. 1999) (reviewing and approving, in the context of undue burden analysis, the district
court's conclusion that Casey directs that "legislation is based on a permissible purpose if it is rea-
sonably related to promoting childbirth over abortion or protecting maternal health").
251. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735-36.
252. Id. at 735.
253. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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In Eubanks v. Schmidt,254 the district court noted that the "possible
ideological component" of the informed consent requirement presented
an "interesting and important enough issue., 255 After reasoning that, ac-
cording to its brief discussion, the Casey plurality must have "believed
these [challenged disclosures] to convey information reasonably related
to informed consent, not ideology," the court further observed that "it is
easy to see why some would disagree.2 56 The court noted that "a statute
requiring every physician to advise women of their right to have an abor-
tion ... might be equally justified as the one here," but concluded that
"[s]imply because a subject is controversial . . . does not make it ideo-
logical. '257 Although "the legislature passed [the statute at issue] to fur-
ther its preference for birth over abortion," the mandated disclosures "do
not overtly trumpet that preference. '2 58 Consequently, the court, like the
Supreme Court, viewed them as "merely providing information.
2 59
The Eubanks court further rejected the abortion providers' claim
that the state statute was invalid because it required providers to pay for
the state-created literature they were also required to distribute. 26 0 Two
other district courts reached the opposite result, reasoning differently as
to both whether a state ideological message was obvious in the disclosure
requirement, and whether abortion providers could constitutionally be
required to pay. In Karlin v. Foust,26 1 the court found that the state statu-
tory requirement that abortion providers distribute "state-printed and
county-compiled materials" was "far more than a simple vehicle for in-
formation distribution.' 262 In its view, the disclosure requirement
"force[d] physicians to associate themselves with the state's anti-abortion
message, a message that is implicit in the information provided even if it
is never stated explicitly. ' '263 Although the court acknowledged that Ca-
sey was binding as to the constitutionality of the distribution require-
ment, it invalidated the additional requirement that the abortion providers
pay for the information. 
264
The district court in Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Ri-
ley265 addressed these questions more recently. In its view:
254. 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).





260. Id. at 460 ("[l]t is not clear that requiring the physicians to pay for the pamphlets changes
the constitutional analysis to any extent.").
261. 975 F. Supp. 1177 (W.D. Wis. 1997).
262. Id. at 1225.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1226. The appellate court did not review the Free Speech Clause part of the holding.
Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
265. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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The Supreme Court's First Amendment decision in Casey expressly
rejected the notion that a state may require distribution only of ideo-
logically neutral information regarding abortion-that is, information
that not only is truthful and not misleading, but also that does not ex-
press a preference in favor of either childbirth or abortion, because
Pennsylvania's challenged informational materials did express a pre-
ference for childbirth over abortion.2
66
After reviewing Supreme Court precedent with respect to compelled
contributions to ideological and commercial speech,267 the court con-
cluded, like the court in Karlin, that "providers of abortion services con-
stitutionally may be required to distribute the state-prepared materials,
and offer for viewing the state-prepared videotape, advancing policy
positions with which they disagree, i.e., the preference of alternatives to
abortion, but they may not be compelled to finance the production of the
materials and videotape."
268
In the Eighth Circuit, four judicial decisions thus far address South
Dakota's requirement that doctors provide those considering abortion a
writing stating, among other things, "[t]hat the abortion will terminate
the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.' '269 The district
court, which was the first court to review the challenge, granted a pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the disclosure requirement,
finding that the abortion providers had established a fair chance of suc-
cess on their claim that the provision unconstitutionally required them to
"espouse the State's ideology. 27° In a divided decision, a circuit court
panel affirmed. 27' The Eighth Circuit reversed the panel in an 8-4 en
banc decision. 72 Judge Gruender, a dissenter in the original panel, wrote
the court's opinion, reasoning that, although "[t]aken in isolation," the
"human being" disclosure requirement "certainly may be read to make a
point in the debate about the ethics of abortion," it must properly be read
to include its narrowing statutory definition. 273 The two judges from the
266. Id. at 1270; see also id. at 1273 n.10 ("Casey distinguished Wooley by saying that the
distribution of an ideological message under the statute at issue in Casey was required only as a part
of the practice of medicine .... ").
267. The Court had not yet decided Johanns, which held that individuals have no First
Amendment right to avoid targeted taxes that fund government speech with which they disagree.
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 562 (2005).
268. Summit Med. Ctr., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1277.
269. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1 (1)(b) (2009).
270. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 375 F. Supp. 2d 881, 887 (D. S.D.
2005) ("Unlike the truthful, non-misleading medical and legal information doctors were required to
disclose in Casey, the South Dakota statute requires abortion doctors to enunciate the State's view-
point on an unsettled medical, philosophical, theological, and scientific issue, that is, whether a fetus
is a human being.").
271. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 725 (2006) (statute's
disclosure provision "forc[es] an abortion provider to recite the state's ideological objections to
abortion").
272. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
273. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735. This "define[s] 'Human being' for the purposes of the informed-
consent-to-abortion statute as 'an individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens, includ-
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panel majority dissented, joined by two other judges, reasoning more
emphatically than they had in their panel opinion that the "human being"
statement "crosses the constitutional line [between permissible factual
disclosures and impermissible ideology] by requiring physicians to
communicate metaphysical ideas unrelated to any legitimate state interest
in regulating the practice of medicine.,
274
The district court on remand granted the state's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the "human being" provision, finding no Free
Speech Clause violation because the statute permitted abortion providers
to explain to patients that the term is biological and not ideological.2 75 It
then addressed whether two other challenged disclosure requirements
were "truthful and not misleading," as the court read Casey to require.
276
Relying upon the state's concession that the required disclosure "[t]hat
the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with th[e] unborn hu-
man being" referred to a legal, rather than a biological, relationship be-
tween the woman and fetus, the court found it to be untruthful, mislead-
ing and thus unconstitutional because such a legal relationship between
born and unborn does not exist as a matter of federal constitutional or
state law. 277 The court also evaluated the statutory requirement that abor-
tion providers disclose "all known medical risks of the procedure . . .
including . . . [an] [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide. 278
Based on a finding that "[d]efendants have produced no evidence ... to
show that it is generally recognized that having an abortion causes an
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide," the court concluded that
"[b]ecause such a risk is not 'known,' the suicide disclosure language of
the statute is untruthful and misleading.",
279
Other courts have applied the "truthful and not misleading" re-
quirement to abortion disclosure requirements. In Eubanks, as part of its
Free Speech Clause inquiry, the court determined that photographs of
fetal development included in state produced material met this standard,
even though some were over-colored and oversized:
True, some of the fetal development photographs are color enhanced
and other photos are enlarged. Even so, the photographs are neither
misleading nor untruthful. Regardless of their size, photographs do
not become misleading so long as the statutorily required scale al-
lows an average person to determine their actual size. Nor does the
ing the unborn human being during the entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full
gestation."' Id. at 727 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-1).
274. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 743 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
275. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 976-77 (D. S.D.
2009).
276. Id. at 977-78. The court seemed to be applying the Free Speech Clause, although some
language suggests that it was considering due process undue burden analysis as well.
277. Id. (first alteration in original).
278. S.D. CODIFIED LAW § 34-23A- 10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2009).
279. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 983.
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color enhancement make an otherwise accurate depiction misleading.
The pictures provide an accurate rendition of the fetus at various
stages of development, as required by the Statute.
2 80
In Karlin v. Foust,28 ' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a statutory requirement that providers inform women seeking abortions
that medical technology was available "to enable a pregnant woman to
view the image or hear the heartbeat of her unborn child" was not false
and misleading, even though it could not actually detect a fetal heartbeat
in the early stages of pregnancy. 82 In Summit Medical Center of Ala-
bama, Inc. v. Siegelman,283 the district court required the addition of cer-
tain other information to render the state-imposed requirement that pro-
viders inform a woman "that a nonviable unborn child at more than 19
weeks gestation 'may be able to survive' outside the womb" consistent
with Casey's requirement that the disclosures be "truthful and not mis-
leading.'
2s4
In sum, in the context of informed consent to abortion, lower courts
have applied the Casey precedent to uphold a wide range of information
disclosure requirements against Free Speech Clause challenges by ser-
vice providers. More explicitly than in the so-called commercial speech
cases, a number of courts and judges have noticed that governments have
selected the particular pieces of information for required disclosure, and,
in some instances, crafted the means of presentation and disclosure for
the purpose of modifying consumer decision making rather than merely
informing it. In this line of cases, the courts uniformly interpret Supreme
Court precedent to require that the court apply deferential review to dis-
closure requirements imposed on abortion service providers' speech
without respect to whether preventing consumer deception is the gov-
ernment's aim.
M. THE DEFERENTIAL ABORTION "INFORMED CONSENT" ANALYSIS
CONTROLS COMMERCIAL SPEECH DISCLOSURE CASES
Although the Court has never noted the similarity, the commercial
speech and abortion disclosure cases in fact address the same Free
Speech Clause right.285 Whatever signals various combinations of jus-
280. Eubanks v. Schmidt, 126 F. Supp. 2d 451,459 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
281. 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999).
282. Id. at 491-92 (reasoning that "the information required to be conveyed under the fetal
heartbeat provision is neither false nor misleading because the services are available to all women; it
is simply a question of when such services would render useful results").
283. 227 F.Supp. 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
284. Id. at 1203 (stating that providers "must go beyond a simple mechanical reading of this
provision and provide the woman with the following information: I) a full and complete definition
of the term 'survive' in accordance with the physician's good faith clinical judgment; 2) the nature
of any survival; 3) survival is merely a possibility; and 4) survival will or may be of extremely
limited duration").
285. The right to choose abortion is a constitutionally protected right on the consumer side, and
so the undue burden analysis could perhaps limit what an abortion provider can be compelled to say
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tices may be sending about the continuing vitality of Zauderer and defer-
ential review of commercial speech disclosure requirements, the Court
cannot consistently apply a higher level of scrutiny to disclosure re-
quirements imposed on products and other types of services so long as
the current abortion "informed consent" jurisprudence exists.
Regulatory authority to require disclosures in the contexts of abor-
286tion and other services and product sales stems from the same source.
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, made precisely this point
when dissenting from one of the Court's early decisions applying Roe to
invalidate persuasive disclosure requirements because of the burden they
placed on the abortion right.287 According to the dissent:
The rationale for state efforts to regulate the practice of a profession
or vocation is simple: the government is entitled not to trust members
of a profession to police themselves, and accordingly the legislature
may for the most part impose such restrictions on the practice of a
profession or business as it may find necessary to the protection of
the public. This is precisely the rationale for infringing the profes-
sional freedom of doctors by imposing disclosure requirements upon
them: "Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on par-
ticular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather
than one which physicians may or may not impose upon them-
selves."
288
The Court has repeatedly recognized that lawyer speech to potential
clients, through advertising, is commercial speech.289 Both of the Court's
primary speech disclosure cases involved lawyer speech.290 Lawyers are
professionals and doctors are professionals. Both provide information
about their services that may influence a potential client to buy it. Both
types of speech, like commercial speech more generally, have constitu-
tional value primarily because of the information they provide to poten-
tial consumers. Again, Justice White in his early dissent, convincingly
linked government regulation of the two types of professional speech,
if the requirement that the woman receive the information poses a significant obstacle to the right to
choose the procedure. See Corbin, supra note 238.
286. States have a general police power to protect consumer and other public interests. Con-
gress's authority to regulate interstate commerce allows it to impose disclosure requirements on
sales and services, and includes regulating the abortion procedure. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124, 166 (2007).
287. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 785 (1986).
288. Id. at 803 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
289. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); lbanez v. Ha. Dep't of Bus.
and Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994); Peel v. Attorney Registration
& Disciplinary Comm'n of II1., 496 U.S. 91, 99-101, 110-11 (1990); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466, 468 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 637-38 (1985); In re R. M. J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 454 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
290. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) ("The
parties agree, as do we, that the challenged provisions regulate only commercial speech."); Zaud-
erer, 471 U.S. at 629.
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citing Zauderer for the conclusion that the same standard of judicial re-
view should apply to disclosure requirements imposed to regulate all
types of commercial speech:
Were the Court serious about the need for strict scrutiny of regula-
tions that infringe on the "judgment" of medical professionals,
"structure" their relations with their patients, and amount to "state
medicine," there is no telling how many state and federal statutes (not
to mention principles of state tort law) governing the practice of med-
icine might be condemned. And of course, there would be no reason
why a concern for professional freedom could be confined to the
medical profession: nothing in the Constitution indicates a preference
for the liberty of doctors over that of lawyers, accountants, bankers,
or brickmakers. Accordingly, if the State may not "structure" the dia-
logue between doctor and patient, it should also follow that the State
may not, for example, require attorneys to disclose to their clients in-
formation concerning the risks of representing the client in a particu-
lar proceeding. Of course, we upheld such disclosure requirements
only last Term.
291
In Casey, a Court majority adopted Justice White's proposed inter-
pretation of the appropriate scope of government authority to require
doctors to disclose information in connection with the abortion proce-
dure.292 Although none of the justices linked the Free Speech Clause
analysis to its lawyer advertising or commercial speech disclosure cases,
the Third Circuit had explicitly characterized the informed consent pro-
vision at issue as a disclosure requirement imposed on commercial
speech.293 More recently, a few other courts and commentators have
noted that the constitutional questions presented by mandated disclosures
of information are similar, whether it is a professional service or a prod-
uct for sale.2 94 No court or commentator appears to have addressed the
two lines of cases and reasoned that the Constitution requires more def-
erential judicial review of abortion disclosures than of disclosure re-
quirements imposed on other types of commercial speech.295 Because
291. Thomburgh, 476 U.S. at 802-03 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626).
292. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
293. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 705 (3d Cir. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
294. Conn. Bar Ass'n v. United States, 394 B.R. 274, 286 n.13 (D. Conn. 2008) ("Although
Zauderer was decided in the commercial speech context, and Casey in the abortion context, a rea-
sonable relation test was applied in both situations to analyze the constitutionality of factual disclo-
sures by professionals."); Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 766 (5th Cir. 2008); Olsen v. Gonza-
les, 350 B.R. 906, 918 (D. Or. 2006) (quoting Hersh v. United States, 347 B.R. 19 (N.D. Tex.
2006)); see also Tushnet, supra note 178, 237 ("We don't generally think of doctor-patient interac-
tions as instances of commercial speech, but the problems of regulating what can be said about a
service provided for money are very similar."); Post, supra note 238, 974-79 (noting the similarity
of the two lines of cases in the context of his argument that certain "informed consent" requirements
should be held to unconstitutionally intrude onto professional speech).
295. If there were to be any difference between the scrutiny applied to disclosure requirements
imposed on pre-abortion speech as opposed to speech preceding other commercial transactions, the
scrutiny with respect to the doctor-patient interchange should be higher. Abortion is a constitution-
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both lines of cases involve the same type of government action taken
with respect to the same category of speech, the analysis that the Court
applies to commercial speech and abortion disclosure requirements must
be the same.
CONCLUSION
In the context of abortion disclosure, the Supreme Court has held
that governments may, through the means of requiring disclosure of in-
formation, pursue purposes other than preventing consumer deception or
even ensuring that the potential abortion consumer receives a free and
unbiased flow of information. The Supreme Court has held that govern-
ments may select information and require its disclosure for the purpose
of persuading potential consumers to eschew the procedure. That is, gov-
ernments may provide information to influence consumer reactions for
the purpose of reducing demand for a lawful product. Additionally, lower
courts have held that governments may present information likely al-
ready known to the consumer in vivid, eye-catching ways that make the
purpose to persuade even more apparent.
All of these holdings provide firm answers to the cigarette manufac-
turers' allegation that graphic labels unconstitutionally compel them to
deliver government speech, as it does to similar challenges that may be
mounted by other types of commercial speakers. The Constitution allows
the government to select and compel the delivery of information in con-
nection with commercial transactions for the purpose of modifying con-
sumer behavior, and, more specifically, for the purpose of persuading
consumers to avoid the purchase entirely. Unless and until the informed
consent to abortion jurisprudence changes, product vendors who argue
that only a government purpose to prevent deception can justify a disclo-
sure requirement imposed on their commercial speech have no case.
ally protected right, which could mean it would add weight to the listener's interest in avoiding
government speech choices. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. And, doctors are professionals, which may
add weight to their interest in avoiding impositions on their patient counseling speech. See Post,
supra note 238, 974-78.

